The late Sri Brijesh Mishra’s perceptive mind and pragmatism in the formulation of foreign and security policies earned him the title of ‘Chanakya of the modern period’. During his long career as a diplomat, he held many important positions and retired from the Indian Foreign Services (IFS) as India’s permanent representative in the United Nations (UN). He was specially chosen by Mrs Indira Gandhi in 1968 to go to China as Charge d’Affaires—an important assignment after the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962—with the specific directions that India’s relations with China, which were ‘in a box’, needed to be changed. Sri Mishra had earlier been deputy secretary (China) during the Sino-Indian conflict. Mrs Gandhi’s choice of Sri Mishra for this onerous task is itself a reflection of his capabilities. He discussed with his counterparts in China ways and means to improve relations between the two countries. While the relations did not improve during his tenure, he did succeed in changing the thinking at the top level in China. On 1 May 1970, Mao told him that the two important Asian countries should not quarrel and that they would be friends again.¹

**Nuclear weapons and doctrine**

Before being appointed the principal secretary to the PM in 1998, Sri Mishra was heading the foreign policy cell of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Sri Mishra had a deep understanding of the complexities of the fast-changing security environment. He was of the view that in the prevailing security environment it was necessary for India to have nuclear weapons. He expressed this clearly even before the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government was formed.² It is widely believed that this formulation was included in the NDA’s election manifesto on the suggestion of Sri Mishra, who was also supported by his friend the late Sri K. Subrahmanyam.

Soon after the NDA government was formed in 1998, India carried out nuclear tests in which Sri Mishra played a crucial role.³ After the nuclear tests, a letter drafted by Sri Brijesh Mishra was sent to Bill Clinton, then US president, justifying the Indian decision for nuclear tests. It stated plainly that the capabilities and activities of India’s ‘northern neighbour’ had prompted the Indian decision. While some experts criticised this decision as a blunder, the China factor was the plain truth. Sri Brijesh Mishra, who had long experience of dealing with China including in the period of the Sino-Indian

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War of 1962, was of the firm view that China should be dealt with from a position of strength. Sri Mishra was of the view that China’s rise was not merely because of its economic development but also owing to its growing military capabilities.⁴

At the same time, Sri Mishra was aware that only having nuclear weapons was not sufficient. He desired that India should also have an unambiguous nuclear doctrine along with credible nuclear deterrence and a sound command and control system. In addition, he was convinced that policy-makers should seek objective advice on security issues on a continuous basis to deal with the fast-changing security environment in which two of India’s neighbours were involved in proliferation activities. He therefore set out to improve the national security apparatus.

He studied the recommendations of the K.C. Pant Committee Report on the need for a National Security Council (NSC) and convinced the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) of the urgent need to establish such an institution.⁵ The NSC would analyse the forces/factors that were creating new security challenges and place before the policy-makers the available options, clearly bringing out the pros and cons. He was convinced that one of the most important structures of the NSC was the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), comprising eminent experts drawn from different fields related to security.⁶ Therefore, even before the establishment of the NSC, he constituted the NSAB which included well-known experts on foreign policy, intelligence and security, nuclear strategy, science and technology, economics and so on.⁷ He inducted even those experts who were not seen as supporters of the NDA government. This board was headed by the late Sri K. Subrahmanyam and included eminent experts such as J.N. Dixit, M.K. Narayanan, M. Dubey, M. Zuberi, R. Narsimha, Jasjit Singh, Sanjaya Baru, Brahma Chellaney, Bharat Karnad, Gen. S.F. Rodrigues, Admiral V.S. Shekhawat, Air Chief Marshal S.K. Mehra, B.G. Verghese, Dr. Raja Ramanna and Dr. U.R. Rao. Sri Brijesh Mishra, who was also appointed National Security Advisor (NSA), remained constantly in touch with the board and tasked it to look into the areas considered important for the country.

Two tasks were given top priority: first, the drafting of a nuclear doctrine; second, taking up the first ever strategic defence review. The NSAB prepared the nuclear doctrine in record time with the late Sri Subrahmanyam ably steering the debate in the NSAB, including those who did not agree with him on the minimum number of nuclear weapons needed for maintaining credible deterrence. Subsequently, this nuclear doctrine was adopted by the Government of India after discussions with the concerned departments. This doctrine was aimed at ensuring that India would not be unnecessarily dragged into a nuclear arms race, while at the same time maintaining the minimum level of deterrence required for the protection of national security interests. The doctrine made it clear that India would use nuclear weapons in a strategic manner if attacked by nuclear weapons. Both documents proved to be invaluable.⁸ Later the command and control system was also put in place. While the Political and Executive Council are well known, the alternative system of command and control for contingency was also worked out, and remains confidential.⁹

Building a team to support NSC structures
Sri Mishra also realised that the NSC must have a secretariat comprising experts on various aspects of security to support the NSC and service its various structures, including the NSC, the NSAB, the Strategic Policy Group (SPG) and other bodies such as the National Information Board and the Intelligence Coordination Group.¹⁰
the question of appointing the secretary of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), who was to act as his deputy, came up, there was a lot of pressure on him to choose a person either from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) or from the Indian Police Service (IPS). However, he decided to appoint a person who could comprehensively understand the security scenario and suggest options objectively. He refused to select a person on the basis of service background. His criterion was the ability of the person to perform the tasks. He selected Sri Satish Chandra, who was at that time India’s high commissioner in Pakistan and who had a deep understanding of the security challenges. Remarkably, Sri Chandra understood the mind of Gen. Musharraf very well. It was he who had pointed out that Gen. Musharraf was ‘an ambitious and scheming individual’ and ‘a hardliner on India’ and that he could topple the democratic government and could ‘frontally take over from the government’ almost a year before the military coup. Sri Brijesh Mishra allowed Sri Satish Chandra to select his team from any service but he told him that the selected officers should be the best available experts in security affairs. Sri Satish Chandra inducted the best officers from IAS, IPS, IFS, Indian Revenue Service (IRS), the armed forces and academic institutions. It took considerable time to build the team. Later Sri Mishra removed the posts of secretary and additional secretary of the NSCS from the central staffing pattern to be able to select suitable persons for these positions both from within and outside the government. The post of secretary was re-designated as the deputy national security advisor to reflect the role more clearly. When Sri Satish Chandra resigned in 2005, Sri Mishra had hoped that the deputy NSA would be selected on the basis of competence and not on the basis of service background.

Sri Brijesh Mishra gave full freedom to the officials of the NSCS to express their views clearly and boldly, even if they went against the policies of the NDA government. When the Lahore Yatra of the Indian PM was organised, which was supported by Sri Brijesh Mishra in the hope that the visit would at least make a marginal difference in the attitude of Pakistan towards India, the Joint Intelligence Committee/National Security Council Secretariat (JIC/NSCS) assessed in February 1999 that ‘notwithstanding the euphoria about the Lahore visit by our PM, there had been no change in the attitude of Pakistan towards India’. Sri Mishra allowed this assessment to be shared with the CCS members. When the Godhra riot took place, the NSCS came out with its assessment that such actions were against the interests of the nation as they could push the minorities onto the side of terrorists. Sri Mishra allowed this assessment to be shared with all members of the CCS and senior officials.

Sri Mishra was secular in the real sense. When he learnt that miscreants, assisted by political leaders belonging to NDA’s allies, were trying to organise a massacre of minorities, he ensured deployment of armed forces in such areas to prevent any untoward incident. He was also sure that the Agra Summit would be a failure long before the event, yet he agreed to allow this to happen to give Pakistan an opportunity to improve relations. His assessments of Pakistan, in which he was assisted by Sri Chandra, were invariably accurate.

Sri Mishra had desired that the NSC discuss the security issues in a broad sense and the NSC charter was accordingly drafted. The NSC charter clearly defined that the NSC would take up issues that would include economic, social, political and military issues. The aim was to consider issues needed for building comprehensive strength of the nation. The NSC, which included the PM, the ministers for defence, home, finance and external affairs as well as the NSA, who was to act as a channel between the NSC and other structures, could invite others as special invitees if the subject demanded
their presence. The three chiefs of the armed forces along with other secretaries and intelligence chiefs were expected to be present at all NSC meetings.

The Strategic Policy Group (SPG) was created to discuss security issues with a view to implementing the decisions taken in the NSC meetings and consider the papers presented by the NSCS and other departments on security issues. The SPG comprised all the important governmental functionaries, including the three services chiefs, the governor of the Reserve Bank of India, the secretary of the Atomic Energy Commission and secretaries of relevant departments. The NSC thus became the first mechanism to provide a role to the armed forces as well as scientists in policy-making.

Sri Mishra asked the NSCS to undertake studies keeping in view India’s mid-term and long-term security requirements. The NSCS took up, on the initiative of Sri Satish Chandra, a study entitled ‘India in 2020’. This study projected different future scenarios, indicated the weaknesses and highlighted what could happen if these issues were not addressed. It also stated how things could improve if corrective measures were adopted. This study took into account both internal and external environments. Sri Brijesh Mishra asked the NSCS to circulate this study to other departments.

Sri Mishra formed the National Information Board (NIB) on the suggestion of Sri Satish Chandra, comprising all the stakeholders, to formulate strategy and coordinate the activities of all departments and agencies. This was an important aspect of the psychological campaign. This board was chaired by the NSA himself. It functioned well but after Sri Brijesh Mishra’s tenure came to an end, it became dormant.

**Reforming the security apparatus**

Soon after the Kargil conflict, Sri Mishra constituted the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) ‘to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in Kargil in 1999 and to recommend measures that are considered necessary to safeguard national security against armed intrusions’. The KRC was headed by Sri K. Subrahmanyam and had Lt. Gen. K.K. Hazari and Sri B.G. Verghese as members and Sri Satish Chandra as the member secretary. The committee comprehensively reviewed the security establishment and made recommendations, including the need for a thorough review of the national security system in the country. Soon a Group of Ministers (GOM) and four task forces to assist the GOM on intelligence, internal security, border management and defence management were formed. After the GOM submitted its recommendations they were accepted, barring one on the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

Sri Mishra knew that the task of implementing the GOM recommendations would require constant monitoring and he therefore immediately appointed the implementation committee under the chairmanship of the cabinet secretary with all the concerned secretaries as its members. The NSCS was designated as the nodal secretariat. However, Sri Mishra remained in constant touch with the developments in this context through the secretary of the NSCS. The ministries that were responsible for implementation of the recommendations were getting tired of periodical meetings and came up with the excuse that since they had written to the concerned states or departments, the action taken on such recommendations should be treated as completed. When this was brought to the notice of Sri Brijesh Mishra, he told the then cabinet secretary that such recommendations cannot be placed in the category of ‘action completed’. During his tenure, several important recommendations, such as the establishment of a Defence
Intelligence Agency, a National Technical Research Organization, one border guarding force, defence modernisation, strengthening of state police and multi-agency centres, had been implemented. His initiative to have a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-INDIA) filled an important gap.

He took a keen interest in improving the intelligence coordination and collection system. In this context, three important aspects deserve mention. Firstly, he desired that the top policy-makers understand the value of well-assessed intelligence inputs. A paper was prepared by Sri Satish Chandra on improving the intelligence coordination system and the assessment-making process as well as the value of assessed intelligence. Sri Mishra asked him to present the paper before the Committee of Secretaries on Security to take the necessary steps. It should also be pointed out that during the Kargil Conflict, the secretary of the NSCS was asked to provide an assessment based on the inputs from all concerned agencies and departments on the developing situation on a daily basis. These ‘all source assessments’ helped the top policy-makers in the decision-making process. Secondly, he desired that the intelligence inputs meet the demands of the consumers. With his approval, Sri Satish Chandra began a system of tasking the intelligence agencies on an annual basis. The tasks were prepared in consultation with the consumers of intelligence. The tasks were divided into main, secondary and peripheral areas of concern. The agencies were asked to suitably deploy their resources so that the first two areas were not neglected. While this excellent system functioned well, it fell into disuse after the tenure of Sri Mishra as the agencies did not like it. And thirdly, he desired that a system of thorough examination of intelligence inputs by the NSCS should be put in place to improve the intelligence collection system. The NSCS began to examine the reports for accuracy of facts, completeness, timeliness and prognosis. The post-event reports were placed in the lower category. These tasks were overseen by the Intelligence Coordination Group chaired by the NSA himself, and included both intelligence producers and consumers. Sri Mishra desired that the intelligence agencies sharply focus on secret information and not reproduce reports that were already available in the media. At one meeting of the Intelligence Coordination Group, he made this point clear, informing the intelligence agencies that such reports were being collected by other agencies/organisations; there was no need to waste their own resources on such reports. This system led to an improvement in the reporting system but after Sri Mishra’s tenure came to an end, this system too gradually fell into disuse, mainly due to opposition by the intelligence agencies.

He supported the view that the state police and intelligence units should be upgraded, as suggested by the GOM after the Kargil War. He suggested that the monitoring group under the cabinet secretary should look into the needs of states and provide necessary financial support. He was especially interested in developing the border regions. He asked the NSCS to look into this aspect. A proposal was mooted to develop roads in the bordering areas and establish integrated check-posts to take care of security aspects as well as to develop facilities for improvement in border trade. The NSCS sent teams that included the representatives of other stakeholders to border areas to identify the points where check-posts could be established. The NSCS was given the task of monitoring progress in this regard. While it progressed well during Sri Brijesh Mishra’s tenure, later the task of monitoring was taken over by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and progress became slow.

In addition, he took steps to have high-quality analytical papers on critical security issues prepared by well-known specialists on security affairs outside the government with the two-fold objective of making available well-researched and analysed papers
to policy makers for better understanding of the complexities involved in dealing with security issues, and also to promote greater security consciousness within the country. In furtherance of these objectives, the NSCS began to financially and academically support the publication of India’s National Security Review (INSAR). This publication covers a wide spectrum of security-related issues contributed by well-known experts. So far 11 volumes have been produced. The NSCS also assisted in the preparation of a national security index, which remains an important dimension of INSAR.20

Foreign policy after the nuclear tests

Sri Mishra’s foreign policies were aimed at dealing with India’s growing isolation because of the nuclear tests and also ensuring that its old ties with Russia remained intact. Therefore, he took steps dexterously to improve relations with the US, the UK, France and China. Sri Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott of the US held several meetings to improve relations between India and the US. In addition, Sri Mishra held talks with US officials. The US, which had begun to appreciate the Indian compulsions to go in for nuclear tests based on clarifications given in a letter sent to the US president, as well as in meetings between Sri Mishra and US officials, helped in mounting pressure on Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Kargil. US President Clinton visited India in 2000 and described India as a ‘natural ally’. However, Sri Mishra told his counterpart, Sandy Berger, in unambiguous terms that India would neither roll back its nuclear programme nor would it sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He also told US officials that unhindered cooperation in commerce, sharing of technology, and partnership in civil nuclear and space projects were necessary for the realisation of the full potential of the Indo-US relationship. Sri Brijesh Mishra also knew that by maintaining friendly relations with the US, it would be easier to deal with China as well as to remove international restrictions on India’s access to uranium and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Later he supported the nuclear deal with the US, disagreeing with the views of the BJP. While he knew that the US was not pressurising Pakistan sufficiently to stop using terrorism against India, he used the US to send a stern message to Pakistan soon after the attack on parliament on the 13th December, 2001. Five terrorists belonging to Pakistan based terrorist groups Lashker-e Toiba (LeT), which is supervised by Hafiz Md. Sayeed and Jaish-e-Mohammed headed by Masood Azhar, entered the Parliament building and started firing on the security guards and civilians. Eleven persons were killed in the firing including all the terrorists, five security personnel and a civilian. This led to increased tension between India and Pakistan. He told the Americans soon after the attack that the heaviest mobilisation of forces had taken place since 1971 and that unless Pakistan stopped supporting such activities, India would be justified in destroying the terrorist centres.

Soon after the visit of the US president, Russian President Putin was invited to visit India and the two countries signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership, aimed at reassuring Russia of India’s commitment to continued close relations, particularly after the US was termed a natural ally. A memorandum of understanding was also signed on intensifying bilateral cooperation on peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, Sri Mishra was also quick to note that Putin had at the same time sent his special envoy to Pakistan to develop closer relations. He tasked the NSCS to keep a close watch on this. The matter of supply of RD 93 engines by Russia for J-17 aircraft being jointly
produced by China and Pakistan was noted and was taken up with Russia by Sri Satish Chandra in his interactions with his Russian counterpart.

Sri Mishra also took steps to improve relations with France. He visited France and discussed the issue of use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Thus, he laid the foundations for Indo-French civil nuclear cooperation.

Sri Mishra knew that China had to be dealt with in an appropriate manner. Soon after the Kargil Conflict a number of high-level contacts were arranged. At the level of foreign ministers it was agreed that neither side would consider the other a threat. The visit of the Indian president to China in 2002 paved the way for cooperation in trade and economic fields and to take up the issues left over from the past in the spirit of cooperation. After he was appointed special envoy, he carried on talks with China on the border issue. In 2003, during Vajpayee’s visit to China, a border trade agreement with China was signed for border trade at Nathula pass. This agreement was important as China had implicitly accepted Sikkim as a part of India. He knew that China was playing a waiting game and therefore he was of the view that sufficient diplomatic pressure was needed on China to resolve the contentious issue. He was a pragmatist and knew that in order to ensure this, cooperation with the US and other Western powers, including Russia, was imperative.

Sri Brijesh Mishra’s master stroke was dealing with the heavy opposition from important powers in the post-II period and winning them over to maintain friendly relations with India. However, he remained clear that whatever the compulsions, there was no need to do anything that might not be in the interests of India. In fact, he was speaking neither for the NDA nor for the BJP, but for India. In short, Sri Mishra believed in the dictum, ‘There are no permanent friends and no perennial enemies, what is permanent are our national interests’.

Concluding remarks
Sri Mishra’s ability to foresee developments was remarkable. When IC 814 was hijacked, negotiations began with the terrorists, who came up with a long list of terrorists to be released. Sri Mishra was confident that the number of terrorists to be released would soon come down. There was a lot of pressure on the NDA government to accept the demands of the terrorists immediately so that the lives of passengers could be saved. Sri Mishra’s confidence that the terrorists would lower their demands was remarkable and convinced the members of the CCS to delay the decision. This allowed the negotiators sufficient time to continue talks and get the number of terrorists to be released reduced.

Sri Mishra was willing to change his views if he was convinced. This was seen on two occasions. First, when the Kargil Review Committee made the recommendation that there should be a separate National Security Advisor, he did not agree. He was of the view that the nascent NSC required the full support of the government and that was possible only when the posts of principal secretary and NSA were held by one person. This arrangement also ensured that contrary advice was not given to the PM. Soon after the formation of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government he had opposed the trifurcation of his position. He later desired that there should be a separate security department under a minister, who would be responsible to parliament. On having a separate intelligence czar, he appeared to have changed his view towards 2011. In one meeting on the need for intelligence reforms held at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), this issue was discussed in the
presence of Sri K. Subrahmanyam and Brijesh Mishra. When Sri Subrahmanyam and others pointed out the need for a National Intelligence Advisor in the changing security environment to continuously monitor the functioning of the intelligence agencies and coordinate their activities, Sri Mishra was convinced of the need for such a position. However, he was of the view that only a person who could understand the functioning of intelligence agencies as well as their shortcomings should be appointed to such a position. Sri Mishra said that if there was a person of the capabilities of Sri Subrahmanyam, he should be appointed National Intelligence Advisor. He was right. Only a very capable person, who understands not only the functioning of the agencies but also their weaknesses, can oversee the functioning of intelligence agencies.

The second incident related to support to the US on the Iraq War. Sri Mishra, who was told repeatedly by UK and US officials that Iraq under Saddam was building nuclear, biological and chemical warfare capability, was in favour of supporting the US. However, he asked Sri Chandra to ascertain the facts and report to him on the issue. Sri Satish Chandra, after interacting with the British chairman of JIC and examining the evidence given by the British side, came to the conclusion that the evidence was extremely weak and Sri Chandra relayed this in no uncertain terms to his British counterpart. Sri Chandra while returning from London prepared the minutes of the meeting on the flight and gave it to Sri Mishra, who changed his views on the issue.

He enjoyed full confidence of the then Indian PM and this allowed him tremendous influence over the NDA ministers. Whenever he spoke it was considered that he was conveying the PM’s directions. Atal Behari Vajpayee had left the task of implementing the decisions taken by the NDA government to Sri Mishra. He also introduced the system of taking timely action—a rare thing to see in a bureaucracy where most decisions are either delayed or indefinitely postponed.

Sri Mishra was outspoken and frankly expressed his views. This created an impression that he was an arrogant person. This was an erroneous view. He was certainly forthright in expressing his views but he was not arrogant. Those who had worked with him knew his concern for others and his ability to understand the viewpoint of others. He showed a lot of patience in this regard. His grasp of subjects was remarkable. Often, on foreign trips, officials would accompany him to brief him before his meeting with senior ministers in other countries. Such officials found that he would grasp the main points in a matter of minutes. It was also felt by some officials that in fact he did not need any briefing at all, but that he listened to the officials so that they would not feel bad.

With the passing of Sri Brijesh Mishra, India has in fact lost a great strategic expert who was guided only by the national interest. In fact he combined several personalities. He was a bureaucrat, a diplomat, a statesman and politician all rolled into one. Sri Brijesh Mishra made a distinctive contribution in reforming the security apparatus and initiated bold and proactive strategic steps for the protection of national interests. The security structure he built and the excellent initiatives he took need to be nurtured and given a greater push forward. In this context, his strategic concept for protecting the national interests by strengthening deterrent capability of the country in the fast changing security environment, system of performance evaluation of security and
intelligence agencies by NSC through its secretariat, the infrastructure development in border areas and modernisation of police forces deserve special attention.

Notes

2. Sri M.K. Rasgotra, former Foreign Secretary, Govt of India and former Chairman of National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) pointed out that Brijesh Mishra had been wanting India to have Nuclear weapon capability since long. See M.K. Rasgotra, ‘The Long Shadow of Bomb cast on India’, Guest Column, The Tribune, http://tribuneindia.com/2012/20120909/edit.html#1.
4. Brijesh Mishra at a seminar in early 2012 organised by the Centre for Policy Research stated, ‘China knows that as long as you are embroiled in South Asia, India will not be able to play larger role in Southeast Asia or in the larger world.’ http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-challenge-us-a-difficult-partners/20120301/html
5. The Report of the K.C. Pant Task Force was not made public. However the notification issued after the decision to form the National Security Council, clearly mentioned that the report of the K.C. Pant Task force was considered. http://www.indiaembassy.org/inews/December/98/9.html
6. The detailed charter of the NSC and its structures including NSAB are given in the Gazette Notification. The Gazette of India: Extraordinary, [Part I- Sec 1], Cabinet secretariat Resolution, New Delhi, the 16th April, 1999, No.281/29/6/98/TS.
7. While the NSC was created on April 16, 1999, the NSAB was formed on November 19, 1998. Ibid.
8. While the Draft Nuclear Doctrine was publicized, the other document remains classified.
9. The Government of India released the Nuclear Doctrine in January 2003. The press release clearly mentioned that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had approved the arrangements for the alternative Chain of command and retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities. The composition of Political and Executive Councils were given but the alternative arrangements were not made public for reasons of security. Prime minister’s Office, Press Release, January 4, 2003, Cabinet committee on Security Revies Progress in Operationalizing India’s nuclear doctrine, http://pub.nic.in/archives/1releg/1ys2003/rjan/2003/r04012003.htm.
10. The National Information Board was formed later and the Intelligence Coordination Group was formed on the recommendation of the Group of Ministers on the national security formed to examine the entire security apparatus of the nation. These were not publicized.
11. Sri B. Raman former NSAB Member and retired Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretary has pointed out that Sri R.N. Kao former head of R & W had advised the then PM to have a Deputy NSA from IAS or from IPS. B. Raman, Brijesh Mishra India’s First NSA, As I knew him, http://www.rediff.com/news/column/brijesh-mishra-rias-first-nsa-as-i-knew/200120929.htm.
15. While one instance has been pointed by Harish Khare, there were other such instances. Harish Khare, ‘Understanding the obligation of ruling India’, The Hindu, dated October 4, 2012.
17. Ibid.
18. This was a classified study. It was circulated only among the concerned ministries and organizations of the Government of India.
19. The study was very comprehensive but as it was meant for internal use, it was not made public.
20. Sri M.K. Rasgotra former Foreign Secretary and Professor Satish Kumar are involved in this task.
21. In 2003, the Declaration on Principles for relations and Comprehensive Cooperation was signed. This was the first comprehensive document on development of bilateral relations was signed at the highest level between India and China. The two PMs also appointed Special representatives to explore from the political perspective of overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement. http://meaindia.nic.in/foreignrelation/china.pdf.

22. Brijesh Mishra told in an interview on August 27, 2009 that initial demand of the terrorists was for the release of 36 terrorists and $200mn as ransom and interned remains of some terrorists buried there. Later negotiations began and the demand was whittled down to the release of three terrorists in lieu of saving the lives of 160 odd passengers. He also stated that all members of the Cabinet Committee on Security including Advani then Home Minister knew about the decisions. http://zeenews.India.com/news/nation/kandhar-trade-off-advani-knew-brijesh_558731.html.