The Kuki–Naga conflict, which was mainly fought on land and identity issues, resulted in the uprooting of hundreds of villages, with the loss of more than 1,000 lives and enormous internal displacement. The British colonial policy of governance in the north-east frontier of India and the rise of ethnic nationalism among both the Kukis and Nagas in the post-independence period were the roots of the conflict. This essay reviews the various essays on the Kuki–Naga conflict of the 1990s and two books, namely *Ethnicity and Inter-Community Conflict: A Case of Kuki-Naga in Manipur* by Aheibam Koireng Singh and *Violence and Identity in North-East India: Naga-Kuki Conflict* by S.R. Tohring.

**Introduction**

Ethnic conflicts and tensions have become a common experience, especially in Asia, Europe and Africa in the post-Cold War period. In the 1990s alone, two dozen ethnic conflicts around the world have each resulted in at least 1,000 deaths.

The beginning of the 1990s was a turbulent period for India. The country witnessed increasing terrorism and insurgency, political instability and economic crisis. Although insurgency in Punjab had abated by the end of 1992, there was an increase in the number of violent incidents perpetrated by insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir and north-east India.

By the turn of the 1990s, India’s north-eastern region witnessed proliferation of ethnic insurgent groups vying for different levels of autonomy, ranging from autonomous district councils to redrawing of state boundaries to create new states. Such demands often led to clashes of interest, resulting in animosity and resultant conflicts. Some such clashes were the Kuki–Naga conflict (1993–1998), Bodo–Adivasi (1996), Dimasa–Hmar (2003) and Kuki–Karbi (2003), Dimasa–Karbi (2004), Bodo–Bangladeshi Muslim (2008, 2010 and 2012) and Rabha–Garo (2011).

The infamous Kuki–Naga conflict of the 1990s is one of the most destructive, widespread and lengthiest of conflicts. It took a toll of more than 1,000 lives, hundreds of homes and villages of both ethnic communities destroyed and thousands internally displaced. The conflict spanned three states of the north-east (Manipur, Nagaland and Assam), although the main conflict was concentrated on the four districts of Manipur—Tamenglong, Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel. Starting in the later part of 1992, the conflict was intense from 1993 to 1994 and slowly abated from 1998.

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review distinguishes the Kuki and Naga ethnic groups and gives brief reviews of essays and two recently published books by Aheibam Koireng Singh and S.R. Tohring dealing exclusively with this conflict. It also evaluates the causes and nature of the Kuki–Naga conflict in various analyses related to insurgency, ethnicity and ethnic conflicts.

**Bases of distinguishing the two ethnic groups**

There are two ways of interpreting the term ‘ethnic’. In the narrower interpretation, ‘ethnic’ groups mean ‘racial’ or ‘linguistic’ groups. The broader definition of the term ‘ethnic’ can be taken from Horowitz’s argument that ‘all conflicts based on ascriptive group identities race, language, religion, tribe, or caste can be called ethnic’.¹

What would be the basis of classification of two groups having the same religion (Christianity), from the same racial stock (mongoloid), the same broader linguistic group (Tibeto-Burman), and even belonging to the same sect (Baptist)?² Proponents of the broader usage reject such distinctions, arguing that the form ethnic conflict takes could be religious, linguistic, racial, tribal and does not seem to alter its intensity, duration, or relative intractability. Their emphasis is on the ascriptive and cultural core of the conflict, and they distinguish it primarily from the largely non-ascriptive and economic core of class conflict.³

The main distinction between the Kukis and Nagas is their difference in cultural practices. Apart from this, the linguistic subgroup of the two groups can be a point of differentiation. Grierson puts the Kukis into the Kuki–Chin linguistic subgroup, and the Nagas within the Naga–Bodo and Naga–Kuki subgroup.⁴ As such, drawing a line between the proper Kuki and proper Naga tribes as defined by colonial ethnographers based on their culture and language is objective and lucid. However, Michel Foucault sees identity as fluid, not fixed, and a product of cultural circumstances. He says: ‘An “identity” is communicated to others in your interactions with them, but this is not a fixed thing within a person. It is a shifting, temporary construction’.⁵

The Kukis are divided by colonial ethnographers into ‘Old’ and ‘New’. They are blessed with custom, culture and lingual affinity. However, the weakening of primordial loyalties can be seen in some of the old Kuki tribes shifting allegiance to Naga. As such, they are labelled ‘intermediary tribes’. Yet most of them acknowledge that culturally they belong to Kuki.

**Essays on the Kuki–Naga conflict**

The first published academic work on this subject is the cause and effect analysis of C. Joshua Thomas’s ‘Kuki–Naga Conflict’.⁶ This essay, which was written at the peak of the conflict, is drawn from content analysis of newspapers and magazines. Thomas accuses the central government for its lopsided policy towards the north-eastern region. In his words: ‘For the present scenario it appears, the Government of India is partly responsible because of its lopsided policy towards the north east. Moreover, right from the beginning, all the governments in India had no clear-cut policy towards the ethnic conflict in the north east, and more particularly in Manipur. Its attitude and policy can be described as an “ad hoc” policy’ (p. 42). Blaming insurgency for the roots of the Kuki–Naga conflict coupled with historical, political, economic and social dimensions, Thomas calls for ‘a fresh package of economic proposals to alleviate poverty,
ations and President s Rule as a temporary respite rather than a permanent solution. However, putting aside a political solution to the vexed Kuki and Naga demands, he assumes an economic solution as the only permanent alternative answer to the Kuki–Naga conflict.

Lal Dena made a socio-historical analysis of the conflict in his essay ‘The Kuki–Naga Conflict: Juxtaposed in the Colonial Context’.7 Terming the Kuki–Naga conflict an ‘elitist conflict over land and right to self-determination’ which means, in the case of the Nagas, complete secession from India and, in the case of the Kukis, internal autonomy with the framework of the Indian constitution, Lal Dena finds the conflict deeply rooted in the colonial legacy where ‘the usual practice of divide and rule policy was fully operative in course of the consolidation of colonial control over the different ethnic tribal groups of Manipur’ (p. 184). He blames the Indian government for repeating the colonial game of using a Kuki against a Naga or a Naga against a Kuki. M. Banerjee and R.P. Athparia’s article, ‘Emergent Ethnic Crisis: A Study of Naga–Kuki Conflict in Manipur’, is an anthropological observation of an outsider mainly through secondary sources.8 They observe that the Kuki–Naga ‘ethnic conflict is nothing but fear psychosis of losing identity’ (p. 79).

The third published work is T.T. Haokip’s ‘The Kuki–Naga Conflict: Issues and Solutions’, which examines the Kuki–Naga question in the context of issues of identity and ownership of land.9 Looking at the conflict in historical perspective, Haokip traces the main causes of the conflict to the practice of head-hunting and the advantage made use of by the British to serve their game plan, and not the control of Moreh.10 He believes that inter-village rivalries and feuds, which were common in many tribal societies, would be found in Kuki–Naga relations without communal overtones and land issues. Agreeing with Haokip’s view, Ningmuanching observes that ‘[c]ommunities that had coexisted as a hill people now emerged as hostile who had apparently inherited a history of antagonism. British intervention... transformed inter-village feuds into ethnic conflict between hill people who were now grouped as the Nagas and the Kukis’.11 Haokip also points out that the Tangkhuls carried out more raids among themselves than the Kukis carried out against them. This argument is supported by Horatia Bickerstaffe Rowney’s argument that Nagas ‘... have always distinguished themselves as caterans and murderers and also for being perpetually at feud with each other, their feuds going down from generation to generation’.12 However, Haokip overstresses the imposition of Nagaland tax, kidnappings and killings of the Kukis in the 1970s and 1980s as being responsible for the formation of Kuki militant organisations to protect themselves from the Nagas.

The formation of militant organisations by the Kukis must be seen more as the consciousness among them for the need for political autonomy. The Kuki National Assembly’s general meeting at Thingkangphai on 19–20 January 1960 passed a resolution to demand Kuki state and therefore submitted a memorandum to the prime minister of India as early as 24 March 1960.

The last but not least of the essays is D. Michael Haokip’s ‘Kuki Naga Conflict in Special Reference to the Chandel District of Manipur’.13 In this essay, Michael Haokip assesses the cause of the conflict from the perspective of both communities and also explains both claims with a counter-explanation mostly drawn from interviews with different personalities. While trying to explore the prospects of peace, the responses of two interviewees reveal the ultimate desires of the two communities: the creation of Kuki state for the Kukis and the achievement of Southern Nagaland for the Manipur Nagas (p. 177).
Apart from research papers, there are several mentions of the causes and nature of the Kuki–Naga conflict in various analyses related to insurgency, low-intensity conflicts, ethnicity and ethnic nationalism. While analysing low-intensity conflicts in India, Vivek Chadha says: ‘The NSCN-IM [National Socialist Council of Nagaland—Isak Muivah] and Kuki rivalry was dormant till Muivah decided to take control over the smuggling haven of Moreh on the Indo-Burmese border . . . Although Moreh is Kuki-dominated, the lucrative spoils of the smuggling trade attracted the NSCN-IM to it’. 14 Tarun Bikas Lahiri identifies the cause of the Kuki–Naga problem as rooted in the shrewd British policy of governance where they baptised and patronised Nagas.15

R. Vashum also traces the ethnic conflicts between the Nagas and the Kukis since 1992 as the outcome of the seed of Kuki–Naga enmity once sown by the British for their colonial and administrative conveniences.16 However, taking a one-sided view, he asserts that ‘the British were said to have planted the “Kukis” to help suppress the Naga unrest against the British forces since the 1830s. The aftermath result is the settling of the Kukis in almost every region of the Naga country’ (p. 184). Seilen Haokip debunks this view, that ‘Kuki was introduced by the British in the latter half of the nineteenth-century’, as the most popular and most erroneous theory with regard to Kuki identity and its origin.17 In contrast, Naga historian Gangumei Kabui asserts that ‘some Kuki tribes migrated to Manipur hills in the pre-historic times along with or after the Meitei advent in the Manipur valley’.18 Even though written records of the history of the Kukis started primarily with the advent of the British, Cheitharol Kumpapa, the court chronicle of the kings of Manipur, and the Pooyas, the traditional records of the Meitei people, include some accounts of Kuki people which date back to 33 AD. This means that the Kukis had been living in Manipur and other north-eastern states since prehistoric times.

Vashum does not explore the other side of the story, that the tribes in the region, including the Nagas, were used by the British in their efforts to suppress one uprising after another, including the Kuki uprising of 1917–1919. Valorising one’s own community as indigenous and sacrosanct, and others as profane and immigrants, is a practice not uncommon in north-east India. Rajesh Dev, while analysing the existential dilemmas of the ‘settler Bengali’ communities in Meghalaya, writes:

The strongest foci of all these experiences, therefore, (have) been the idea of ‘indigienity’ through which ethnic groups have structured a self-image of a community that is often contradistinguished with ‘settler communities’. This self-image is a cascading phenomenon where each ethnic group considers the other as ‘settler’ and as such claims the settled areas as its own heritage. The resulting contestations breed ‘tense, mistrustful, anxiety-haunted society/ies’ where even cultural spaces often ‘become occupied territory’ (p. 81).19

In his introductory chapter on The Lushai Expedition 1871–72, R.G. Woodthorpe describes the nature of relations that prevailed among the tribes of the British north-east frontier:

The North-eastern frontier of India has ever been a fruitful source of trouble and expense for the Government of this Empire. The history of each district on this frontier, whether prior or subsequent to its annexation as a portion of British territory, is almost the same. Bordered by, or forming part of hill districts, inhabited by fierce and predatory tribes for ever making raids on their neighbours’ villages, burning and plundering them, and carrying off the inhabitants.20
vage themselves from the wrath of the British, they often acted against the Kukis. Edward A. Gait writes: ‘His [Captain Fisher’s] first care was to cope with the irruptions of the Kukis. This he did by the expedient of setting along the frontier as many Manipuris as possible, who when supplied with as few firearms, easily kept off the Kukis, and so protected, not only themselves, but also the less warlike plainsmen behind them’ (p. 300).21

In this regard, Lal Dena too writes how the colonial government also used the Tangkhul Nagas against the Kukis: ‘On return from the war, the Tangkhul Nagas were again enlisted in the coolie sections of the Kuki punitive measures which were unleashed for the sole purpose of suppressing the Kuki uprising’.22 Lal Dena writes ironically about how the Christian missions and the official circles tended to look upon the uprising as merely a local war between the Thadou-Kukis and the neighbouring tribes, obviously implying the Nagas.23

One of the consequences of the Tangkhuls’ assistance to the colonial government in suppressing the Kuki rising was the growing tension within the Baptist churches, which made Frederick Downs, a church historian of India, to succinctly comment: ‘At the beginning of the Christian movement converts from both groups worked closely with each other, but following the Kuki Rebellion during which many Nagas assisted the government in its operations against the Kukis, tension within the Baptist church increased’.24

In his special report to the president of India dated 5 October 1993, the then governor of Manipur, V.K. Nayar, named the Kuki–Naga conflict as an extension of NSCN-IM’s design to increase their domination, fight control of National Highway-39 (now NH-2) and Moreh for illegal resources borne out of smuggling narcotics and contraband trade and to get the major share of the compensation of Rs 12.5 crores from the Maphou dam in Thoubal district.

**Some observations on the two books on the Kuki–Naga conflict**

Two books on the Kuki–Naga conflict have been published, both of which were doctoral theses. The first book Aheibam Koireng Singh’s *Ethnicity and Inter-Community Conflict: A Case of Kuki-Naga in Manipur*.25 Singh identifies the Kuki–Naga conflict as an ‘extension of the conflict due to the claim over a territory as one’s own exclusive homeland by ethnic armies and resistance to it’ (pp. x–xi). Thus, he observes that the expansionist designs of the Naga ethnic army were corroborated by the legislators of Nagaland and they sought to achieve Greater Nagaland through constitutional means.

There were peace and reconciliation efforts under the initiation of the church leaders of both communities. Most of the time, however, their efforts proved futile and ineffective, having no significance as tribe loyalty has a stronger hold than Christian fraternity amongst both warring groups. Indirectly pointing the finger at some Naga elements, Singh says: ‘During the initial years of the clash, some sections of the groups involved tried to reactivate and resurrect their past traumas at each other’s hand to instigate the crown sentiment’ (p. 198). Indeed, the Kuki–Naga clash of the 1990s, which rocked the whole of Manipur, cannot be attributed to one single factor. As Singh observes, it was the result of both historical and contemporary factors (p. 98).

The second book on the Kuki–Naga conflict is S.R. Tohring’s *Violence and Identity in North-East India: Naga–Kuki Conflict*.26 The book opens with a theoretical chapter, which deals with the explanation, approaches of ‘ethnic identity’ and ethnic identities
Kuki tribe who then joined the Naga identity (p. 27). She pejoratively terms the Old Kuki a misnomer, keeping aside the cultural and lingual affinities that exist between what the British termed the Old Kukis (the Anal, Aimol, Lamkang, Maring, Monsang, Moyon, Kom and Chiru) and the New Kukis (Thadou, Paite, Zou, Vaiphei, Hmar, Gangte and Simte). Taking such a view at the outset is an insinuation that her academic work would be often subjected to subjective tendencies. Even Gangumei Kabui and anthropologist Lucy Zehol treats such groups as ‘intermediary tribes’.27

Research in social sciences is often loaded with subjectivity. It usually tries to create the impression that the results of the research have objective character. As such, taking into account one fact and overlooking others remains a problem and this is how ethnic politics is usually reproduced in academic works.

Some of the stories that Tohring unfolds are fascinating. However, the primary problem that remains is the exaggerated portrayal of less intense beatings and humiliations of the Nagas, while disregarding the rape and killings of hundreds of Kukis (p. 143). Tohring makes a contradictory claim about the episode between Thawai Kuki and Thawai Tangkhul village when she states: ‘The Thawai Kuki village was given a “Quit notice” by the Thawai Tangkhul village. Th. Muivah, the General Secretary of NSCN-IM, who was in Nagaland for a consultative meeting with the Naga public condemned the incident and told the Nagas to restrain from it. As a result of it, it was pacified’ (pp. 145, 163). An interview with Lhaichin Haokip, a former resident of Thawai Kuki, talking about this incident reveals that armed Naga militants came to Thawai Kuki village and ordered the villagers to leave. The militants roamed around the village all night and due to fear and intimidation they left the village and temporarily settled in the nearby Kuki village, Sikibung. After a month the Thawai Tangkhul villagers requested them to settle in the village again; it was not the NSCN-IM that was involved.

In contrast to the claims of Tohring, the NSCN-IM again served ‘quit notice’ to the innocent villagers of Thawai Kuki on 23 November 2004. The Kuki Students’ Organisation, while appealing to the Naga outfit to withdraw its notice immediately to avoid eruption of communal violence, pointed out that threat/quit notice had also been served before by the chairman of Thawai Tangkhul village, R.K. Shangreishui, on 11 March 2004, threatening villagers against using the village land.29

Newspapers are an important source of information in social sciences. Nevertheless, there is a tendency towards false reporting and so due care needs to be taken. The views and comments related to a particular event can be biased. For instance, Tohring quotes an overweening and sweeping statement made by Imphal-based journalist Paradip Phanjoubam:30 ‘Historically, the Nagas are the original settlers of the hill ranges and are extremely possessive about their land . . . The Kukis are less passionate about a land of their own—in fact the majority does not support the idea of a Kukiland’ (pp. 110–111). The question that can be raised here is whether Paradip Phanjoubam ever conducted a survey among the Kukis to draw the conclusion that they are ‘less passionate’ about their land or whether the majority of them do not support the idea of Kukiland. This statement seems to be more of a euphemistic edifice. It questions the analysis not only of the reporter but also of the scholar herself.

While both A.K. Singh and S.R. Tohring are from Manipur, the epicentre of the conflict, more could have been done through interviews of both community leaders
both Kuki and Naga civil society organisations and human rights groups.

One of the prominent discourses on Kuki–Naga relations is that of the traditional rivalry between the two ethnic groups. It is pertinent to raise the question of whether there is a traditional Kuki–Naga enmity. Even though S.K. Chaube correctly identifies that ‘segregation’ was the initial British policy for the frontiers, he does not go beyond the cliché ‘traditional Kuki–Naga feud’ theory of which the British make use for political purposes. The question again is, was there a traditional Kuki–Naga feud before the British?

Aheibam Koireng Singh observes: ‘Rivalries were not totally absent in the traditional relationship of the Kukis and the Nagas’ (p. 27). Indeed, during the colonial period there were conflicts between some villages and also due to the rejection to join hands in fighting British rule. P. Gangte writes: ‘In fact there had been more rivalries amongst the Tangkhuls themselves than with the Kukis; and the same is true of the Kabuis’. T.T. Haokip also observes: ‘It has been recorded with exaggeration that the Kukis and Nagas are traditional enemies’.

What is perhaps most intriguing about Tohring’s analysis is the way she reproduces ethnic politics in academic works. And perhaps what will bewilder readers the most is that Tohring repeatedly tries to find fault with the Kukis and quotes mostly what suits her intentions, thus engaging in the most tiresome sort of Naga scholasticism. Even during the height of the conflict the then president of India, R. Venkataraman, relying on the Manipur governor’s report, accused the then chief minister of Manipur, Rishang Keishing, of being involved directly in the conflict.

Regarding the Nagas as the oldest inhabitants of the hill areas of Manipur, Nagaland and its adjacent hill areas and the Kuki tribes as late arrivals seems to be based on some select colonial records (p. 56). In contrast, J.H. Hutton speaks about the migration of different tribes in north-east India and Myanmar in his preface to Henry Balfour’s book *The Sema Nagas*. He writes:

This area has been subjected to emigration from at least three directions—from the north-east, whence came the Tai races; from the north-west, whence came the Singphos, Kacharis, and Garos, among others, and from the south, as the Angami Nagas at any rate came to their present country from that direction, while a migration from the south northwards on the part of the Thado Kukis and Lusheis has barely ceased even now.

**Concluding remarks**

As the lengthiest and most destructive ethnic conflict in the north-eastern region of India, many works have been written and published on the Kuki–Naga conflict focusing on ethnicity and identity. Some works are also written on the other dimensions of the conflict—the consequences of internal displacement, and the livelihood and health of the displaced people. Various action researches were also carried out by the Indo-Global Social Service Society (IGSSS) and the North Eastern Social Research Centre (NESRC) on the traditional conflict mitigation methods with special focus on the Kuki–Naga conflict.

Although both Aheibam Koireng Singh and S.R. Tohring engaged themselves in some sort of ethnic scholasticism, they also explored plausible ways for peaceful co-existence between the two ethnic groups. Due to their dealings with the inherent subjective matter, a *mea culpa* is expected to be performed by both authors, but is not provided. Nonetheless, the books largely encapsulate most of the pertinent issues and
of the Kuki–Naga conflict one needs to study the above-reviewed essays and books.

The Kuki–Naga conflict needs to be understood from the historical settings during the British colonial rule and their peopling. In the post-independence period, the demand for an exclusive ethnic homeland by both the Kukis and Nagas with overlapping territory was one of the main causes of the conflict.

Notes
2. About 80 per cent of both the Kukis and Nagas are Baptist Christians.
5. A detailed discussion on Michel Foucault’s views on identity can be found at http://www.theory.org.uk/ctr-idem.htm (Accessed 19 July 2011).
10. Moreh is a small town on the Indo-Myanmar (Manipur–Sagiang) border. It is known for drug smuggling and the insurgent groups giving protection and sharing some percentage of the profits.

24. Frederick S. Downs, History of Christianity in India, 5(5), Bangalore, Church History Association of India, p. 110.


28. Mrs Lhaichin Haokip, a widow, who now lives in Khokon village, Saikul Subdivision of Sadar Hills, Manipur, with her three sons. She was married to one (L) Doukam Haokip of Thawai Kuki village in the late 1980s. The data are derived from a conversation with her on 7 January 2011 at Khokon village about what had happened on the ground.


35. Nehkhomang Haokip was awarded a doctoral degree by North-Eastern Hill University in 2012 for his thesis entitled Internal Displacement: A Study of the Kukis and Nagas in the Hills of Manipur, which studies the conflict-induced displacement of the Kukis and Nagas in the hills of Manipur, its consequences and the response of the government and non-governmental agencies. Ruth Nengneilhing also submitted her doctoral thesis to Jawaharlal Nehru University in 2012 on the topic Livelihood and Health in the Context of Ethnic Conflict, focusing on the Kuki–Naga conflict.