* Since Nehru’s times India has supported a policy of universal and non-discriminatory disarmament
* In the initial years after independence India’s main aim was to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was chose to be firmly opposed to nuclear arms or nuclear weapons test
* India’s suggestion at UN for end to all nuclear weapons led to the Atoms for Peace Programme initiated by US in 1957. This later became the IAEA
* 1963: India ceded to the Limited Test Ban Treaty
* 1968: NPT
	+ India’s concern about universal disarmament was not addressed. Hence India did not sign
	+ Only four sovereign states now are outside the treaty: India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea
* 1974: Pokhran I
	+ The challenge of expanded nuclear weapons deployment in Indian Ocean by the US and the Soviet Union and the progressive nuclear weaponization of Pakistan and China led India to go nuclear
	+ Various sanctions followed and India’s access to nuclear and dual use technology was cut off
* London Club was set up in response to Pokhran 1. This later became NSG.
* 1988: Rajiv Gandhi proposed a time bound programme for disarmament in the special session of UN GA
	+ Aka Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan
		- The plan was to be implemented in three stages over the next 22 years
	+ Was through at the Six Nation Five Continent Initiative on Peace and Disarmament
	+ In 2011, a committee headed by Mani Shankar Aiyer submitted a report to take forward the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi action plan
		- The report outlines a seven point roadmap, including India reiterating its commitment to eliminating its own arsenal as part of a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable global process and promoting delegitimizing of nuclear weapons to set the state for “negotiating Nuclear Weapons Convention that would discuss a world without nuclear weapons in a specified time frame”
* 1996: CTBT
	+ Was discriminatory
	+ The treaty did not talk about the already stored nuclear arsenal
	+ Till this time countries like the US had developed capabilities to perform nuclear tests in the laboratories and this treaty did not tell anything about limiting laboratory testing

India’s nuclear doctrine

* Draft nuclear policy released in 1999 and amended in 2003
* Objective: to project that India’s nuclear test explosions had a peaceful content and intentions. It seeks to project India as a responsible nuclear weapon state. Reiterate India’s commitment to global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament
* Four key principles
	+ India has voluntarily undertaken not to test a nuclear weapon
	+ No use of nuclear weapon against non-nuclear weapon state < now modified that India will not use nuclear weapon against a non nuclear state which is not aligned to a nuclear weapon state>
	+ No first use. Will not use nuclear weapons unless the other country uses WMD (nuclear, chemical, biological)
	+ Will follow credible minimum deterrence under which it would deploy only such nuclear weapons that are necessary to safeguard its strategic interest

Institutions to handle nuclear weapons in India

* Two institutions
	+ Nuclear Command Authority
	+ Strategic Force Command
* NCA
	+ Has two components: Political Council and Executive Council
	+ Only the political council can authorise the retaliatory nuclear attack
	+ Executive Council provides inputs for decision making by the NCA and it also executes direction given to it by Political Council
* SFC
	+ Custodian of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems
	+ Will also formulate the strategy for retaliation and advice the chiefs of Staff committee and actually fire the nukes

Major treaties

IAEA

* World’s center of cooperation in the nuclear field
* Three main areas of work for IAEA
	+ Safety and security
	+ Science and technology including peaceful nuclear technologies
	+ Safeguards and verification
* IAEA only reports discrepancies after inspections to the UN as it has no enforcement power
* The inspection system of IAEA is designed to deter proliferation through international pressure, disapproval and possible sanctions and counter measures

**Challenges ahead for India's nuclear diplomacy**

Siddharth Varadarajan (Nov 1, 2011)

[Share](http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=20)  ·   [Comment](http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/siddharth-varadarajan/article2586304.ece#comments) (10)   ·   [print](http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/siddharth-varadarajan/article2586304.ece?css=print)   ·   [T+](http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/siddharth-varadarajan/article2586304.ece)   [T+](http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/siddharth-varadarajan/article2586304.ece?textsize=large&test=1)  ·   [T-](http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/siddharth-varadarajan/article2586304.ece?textsize=small&test=2)



Indian officials will have taken heart from French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe’s (left) public articulation in a recent interview that Paris did not consider itself bound by the new guidelines when it came to nuclear commerce with India. Photo: AFP

Nullifying the effect of the Nuclear Suppliers Group's ban on enrichment and reprocessing exports will require diplomatic finesse and commercial hardball.

After the diplomatic successes of 2008, when the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) exempted India from the cartel's ban on atomic sales to countries that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or placed all their nuclear facilities under international safeguards, 2011 has not been a very good year at all.

Negotiations with the Japanese on a nuclear agreement have run aground, India's liability law is being unfairly attacked by its potential partners and, of course, the 46-nation NSG adopted new guidelines for the export of sensitive nuclear technology this June — Including enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) equipment and technology — that made the sale of these items conditional on the recipient state fulfilling a number of “objective” and “subjective” conditions. The first of these conditions, namely NPT membership and full-scope safeguards, were specifically designed to dilute the 2008 waiver India received and were not needed to ban ENR sales to any of the other three countries outside the NPT (Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) since the NSG's original guidelines — with their catch-all NPT conditionality for the export of any kind of nuclear equipment — continue to apply to them.

Though Washington denies targeting New Delhi and says it has been working to restrict the sale of ENR equipment and technology for many years now, the new guidelines' redundant reference to the NPT was introduced in order to fulfil an assurance that Condoleezza Rice, who was U.S. Secretary of State at the time, gave Capitol Hill in 2008. Some Congressmen feared other nuclear suppliers would steal a march on the United States by offering India technologies the U.S. wouldn't. To allay their concerns, the U.S. administration said it would ensure an NSG-level ban on sensitive nuclear technology exports to India. A draft was circulated in November that year and finally approved in June 2011.

***The Hindu's* report**

The fact that India failed to prevent the adoption of the new guidelines despite knowing they were in the pipeline for more than two years suggests a certain complacency on the Manmohan Singh government's part. We know from WikiLeaks cables that the issue was dutifully raised by Indian diplomats in many of their meetings with U.S. officials. But never was the proposed ENR ban projected by the government as an attempt by Washington to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the nuclear bargain it had struck with India.

When *The Hindu* broke the story about the G-8 deciding to implement such a ban in 2009 pending its adoption by the full NSG, senior Indian ministers took the view that this did not matter. It was only when the Nuclear Suppliers Group finally adopted the new guidelines this June that South Block decided to put on its punching gloves.

The fact is that the NSG's 2008 decision to lift its embargo on India was not some kind of unilateral concession. It was part of a complex bargain involving reciprocal commitments by both sides. If the supplier nations agreed to drop their insistence on the NPT and full-scope safeguards and open the door to full civil nuclear cooperation with India, India committed itself to fulfilling several onerous steps, including the difficult and costly separation of its civilian and military nuclear programmes, the placing of its civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, the signing of an Additional Protocol, as well as extending support to a number of nonproliferation and disarmament-related initiatives at the global level. At a fundamental level, the logic of this bargain hinged on two components. First, the NSG was making a judgment about India's status as a responsible country with advanced nuclear capabilities. Second, the NSG and India were acting on the basis of reciprocity.

**India's expectations**

Though Indian officials made their anger known almost immediately in off the record briefings, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna finally provided the government's formal response to the new NSG guidelines in a *suo moto* statement to Parliament in August. Noting the concerns that had been raised by MPs, he made the following “clarifications”: (1) The basis of India's international civil nuclear cooperation remains the special exemption from the NSG guidelines given on September 6, 2008 “which contain reciprocal commitments and actions by both sides.” (2) That exemption accorded “a special status to India” and “was granted knowing full well that India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” Pursuant to the “clean” exemption, “NSG members had agreed to transfer all technologies which are consistent with their national law” including technologies connected with the nuclear fuel cycle.

Mr. Krishna said the only outstanding issue is the “full implementation” of the September 2008 understanding. “This is what we expect and our major partners are committed to.” This understanding contained commitments on both sides. “We expect all NSG members to honour their commitments as reflected in the 2008 NSG Statement and our bilateral cooperation agreements.”

The Minister then noted the statements made by the U.S., France and Russia following the NSG's June 2011 meeting in which each country tried to assure India that the new guidelines would not “detract” from or “affect” the original waiver granted in September 2008. Stating that not every NSG member has the ability to transfer ENR items to other countries, Mr. Krishna added: “We expect that those that do and have committed to do so in bilateral agreements with India, will live up to their legal commitments.” He also held out a carrot — the huge expansion planned for India's civil nuclear industry — and repeated once again in that context that “we expect that our international partners will fully honour their commitments in this regard.”

**French example**

While the three big nuclear suppliers have all said the new guidelines do not “detract” from the grand bargain of 2008, South Block should not set much store by these assurances. The fact is that there has been a setback and a diplomatic effort is needed to recover lost ground and ensure that India is excluded from the purview of the new ENR restrictions imposed by the NSG.

The one supplier that has been the most forthcoming so far is France. Indian officials will have taken heart from French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe's public articulation in an interview in Delhi last month that France did not consider itself bound by the new guidelines when it came to nuclear commerce with India. The Minister confirmed that notwithstanding the NSG rules, Paris remained free to sell ENR items and technology in a manner consistent with its national law and its bilateral agreement. French diplomatic sources also told this writer that the French delegation at the NSG meeting in June had entered a verbal reservation to the new ENR guidelines questioning their applicability to India. The French intervention was not challenged and was duly recorded in the minutes, the sources said.

Of course, the challenge for India will be to hold the French to their word, as and when the requirement for cooperation in the ENR field is required. Though India has its own capabilities in these fields, there is no reason why it should not seek access to the best international components and equipment for the new reprocessing plant it has committed to build. With both France and Russia, India must make it clear that the multibillion dollar contracts which are on the anvil for the purchase of new reactors will also depend on Paris and Moscow's willingness to follow through on their promises and commitments on full civil nuclear cooperation. The U.S. has not so far committed itself to sell ENR equipment to India. New Delhi can live with that. But not with American efforts to block others from cooperating with it.