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Contributions of Prof. kenneth Arrow

Possibly in a little layman language. Newspapers have got too much technical regarding this. What does he meant for India (if in any way).

Also discussion on his personal views regarding various issues and in general is welcome.

Most important of his work seems to be this:


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Comments

  • Aajkal forum par ldkio ki original pic ka trend chl rha hai :o :p
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  • maggie said:

    Possibly in a little layman language. Newspapers have got too much technical regarding this. What does he meant for India (if in any way).

    Also discussion on his personal views regarding various issues and in general is welcome.

    Most important of his work seems to be this:


    Its theory of party system useful for political science student.
    if u r pol sci student read it 4m SR notes its given in simple language .
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  • edited March 2
    :)
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  • @maggie may i know, from where is this slide taken??
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  • RaceCar said:

    @maggie may i know, from where is this slide taken??

    Google search...
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  • Maggie maggie.....bas 2 minute..... :yum:
    You talk when u cease to be at peace with your mind
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  • Maggie maggie.....bas 2 minute..... :yum:

    Not edible though...
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  • maggie said:

    Maggie maggie.....bas 2 minute..... :yum:

    Not edible though...
    Ur talking to psychopath.
    You talk when u cease to be at peace with your mind
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  • Let's apply Impossibility Theory to UP elections:

    Let us suppose all voters are asked to rank the three main leaders in the fray—Narendra Modi (or his surrogate), Akhilesh Yadav and Mayawati, from one to three. Then a social planner is given 100 million ballot papers and asked to choose the next chief minister of Uttar Pradesh. What would be the right way of doing this?

    The social planner could use a simple majority rule in which the candidate that wins in one-on-one face-offs against every other candidate wins the election.


    Let us assume that 40 of a total electorate of 100 voters, comprising the Dalit-Muslim coalition, prefer Mayawati to Yadav and Yadav to Modi.

    Another 30 comprising upper-caste Hindus and non-Yadav Other Backward Classes (OBC) prefer Modi to Mayawati and Mayawati to Yadav.

    The last 30, comprising Yadavs, Muslims and the youth, prefer Yadav to Modi and Modi to Mayawati.

    Then, in a straight fight, Mayawati defeats Yadav, who in turn defeats Modi. But in a contest between Modi and Mayawati, Modi wins. So the majority rule fails to yield a decisive victor.

    If we revert to the first-past-the-post system in which the candidate with the maximum number of first-place ranks wins, then Mayawati wins decisively. But that is only because Yadav is acting as a spoiler by pipping Modi in the Yadav-Muslim-youth segment. If Yadav withdraws from the contest, then in a straight fight Modi defeats Mayawati.
    This prospect may seem irrelevant, but recall the 2000 US presidential election in which Al Gore lost the presidency to George Bush because of his 600-vote defeat in Florida, while Ralph Nader played spoiler, taking 100,000 votes that would have gone mostly to Gore. Now we begin to see the need for a voting rule that is not susceptible to such a reversal of outcomes, or as Arrow put it, a rule that satisfies the property of the “independence of irrelevant alternatives”.

    With several voting rules on offer, surely there should be some that satisfy the reasonable criteria of being decisive, independent of irrelevant alternatives and respectful of the consensus view? And yet, Arrow proved, stunningly, that any social choice rule that satisfied all three conditions could only do so because of the presence of a dictator whose individual preference would be the social preference irrespective of the rankings of others. This is the celebrated Impossibility Theorem that has spawned a whole branch of research called social choice theory.

    courtesy-mint
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  • soo said:

    Let's apply Impossibility Theory to UP elections:

    Let us suppose all voters are asked to rank the three main leaders in the fray—Narendra Modi (or his surrogate), Akhilesh Yadav and Mayawati, from one to three. Then a social planner is given 100 million ballot papers and asked to choose the next chief minister of Uttar Pradesh. What would be the right way of doing this?

    The social planner could use a simple majority rule in which the candidate that wins in one-on-one face-offs against every other candidate wins the election.


    Let us assume that 40 of a total electorate of 100 voters, comprising the Dalit-Muslim coalition, prefer Mayawati to Yadav and Yadav to Modi.

    Another 30 comprising upper-caste Hindus and non-Yadav Other Backward Classes (OBC) prefer Modi to Mayawati and Mayawati to Yadav.

    The last 30, comprising Yadavs, Muslims and the youth, prefer Yadav to Modi and Modi to Mayawati.

    Then, in a straight fight, Mayawati defeats Yadav, who in turn defeats Modi. But in a contest between Modi and Mayawati, Modi wins. So the majority rule fails to yield a decisive victor.

    If we revert to the first-past-the-post system in which the candidate with the maximum number of first-place ranks wins, then Mayawati wins decisively. But that is only because Yadav is acting as a spoiler by pipping Modi in the Yadav-Muslim-youth segment. If Yadav withdraws from the contest, then in a straight fight Modi defeats Mayawati.
    This prospect may seem irrelevant, but recall the 2000 US presidential election in which Al Gore lost the presidency to George Bush because of his 600-vote defeat in Florida, while Ralph Nader played spoiler, taking 100,000 votes that would have gone mostly to Gore. Now we begin to see the need for a voting rule that is not susceptible to such a reversal of outcomes, or as Arrow put it, a rule that satisfies the property of the “independence of irrelevant alternatives”.

    With several voting rules on offer, surely there should be some that satisfy the reasonable criteria of being decisive, independent of irrelevant alternatives and respectful of the consensus view? And yet, Arrow proved, stunningly, that any social choice rule that satisfied all three conditions could only do so because of the presence of a dictator whose individual preference would be the social preference irrespective of the rankings of others. This is the celebrated Impossibility Theorem that has spawned a whole branch of research called social choice theory.

    courtesy-mint

    Thanks @soo ...
    ·
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